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Abstract 
This paper is about Japanese official development assistance (ODA) , based on document 
research and monitoring of media reports in the period between January and October, 2005. It 
analyses changes in this aspect of Japanese foreign policy since its inception in the l 950's with 
this analysis then used to predict what further change may be likely to result in the programme in 
the immediate future. Building on a conflict model of the Japanese state that treats the 
bureaucracy as a divided but powerful power centre, the paper argues that recent developments 
in Japanese society have led to a situation where the political wing of government and civil 
society have come to play a larger part in both the implementation of ODA and , to a lesser 
extent, the creation of aid policy. It concludes that the individual ministries of the bureaucracy 
are unlikely to transfer power to these groups without any resistance and that this resistance will 
hinder efforts to provide more political leadership of, and wider societal input into, the Japanese 
ODA programme. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Purpose 
This year marked the 50th anniversary of the commencement of Japanese aid to the developing 
world with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organising a number of symposiums and workshops 
around the country to mark the occasion. Japan has gone, over the last fifty years, from a nation 
receiving aid from others to a creditor nation which, for most of the l 990's, provided the largest 
amount of aid of all developed nations. Even now, in its economic and financial crises, it still 
provides the second largest overall amount of aid. 
As Dobson notes, change in Japan is incremental (Dobson, 2005). These small but real 
steps have seen Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) evolve into a seemingly quite 
different animal from limited beginnings. This paper looks at the changes in Japanese aid and 
attempts to answer the question of what further changes we can expect in the near future. 
The Japanese aid programme has a number of outstanding characteristics that have 
endured over these fifty years. These are (1) the lack of a centralized aid agency; (2) a firm 
emphasis on the responsibility of the recipient for its own development and (3) a heavy reliance 
on loan aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b). While these are unlikely to entirely disappear 
over the next few years, they do offer a window into understanding the development of the 
current Japanese ODA system and its structural constraints. 
While the power of the bureaucracy in the Japanese state has been well documented 
1 
and the administration of aid is no exception, this is combined with intense rivalry between 
differing ministries and agencies. The lack of a single national agency responsible for ODA can 
be seen in the simple statistics that Japan has 13 ministries with budgets providing for ODA 
activities, two implementation agencies (one for technical cooperation, another for loan aid). 
Until the last few years, in fact, two different ministries issued their own separate white papers on 
ODA further complicating the formation of any unified Japanese aid policy. Without a single aid 
agency responsible for policy creation and implementation, aid has been administered and 
policy made, to a rather large extent, by individual agencies of the bureaucracy negotiating with 
each other, rather than by force of political will . 
Official Japanese aid documents often refer to the need for "Self-Help" , the 
responsibility of a nation for its own development. The other end of the spectrum, where the 
recipient relies completely on the donor for development strategy, individual project planning 
and finance, is seen as the worst possible way of bringing about economic development creating 
international 'beggars ' . This position is used to justify the use of loans in Japanese ODA as 
encouraging the governments of recipient nations to take ownership of their own development 
and not simply rely on outsiders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b) . 
Loans are seen as encouraging good fiscal policies among recipients and, in turn, the 
official Japanese response to suggestions of debt write-offs by and for those nations suffering 
under excessive debt levels has been quite cold. Where a complete refusal to cooperate has not 
been possible, Japan has compromised by providing grants equal to the amounts paid back by 
the debtor country. Behind the scenes, Japan has even been criticized as threatening recipients 
with a termination of future aid if they apply for aid reduction (Oxfam International, 2000). 
Over the last few years, however, there has been a number of changes in the Japanese 
political world and society that suggests change may also be felt in ODA over the coming years. 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), for example, which continuously governed Japan from 
1955 throughout the period of economic growth (in what is termed the 1955 system), finally lost 
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its gnp on power m an election loss in 1993, replaced by a coalition government. This 
breakdown of the stability of this one-party rule lead to reform of the electoral system and, 
indirectly, to a shake up of even the bureaucracy by the end of the decade. 
Throughout the 1955 system, the bureaucracy had a seemingly well-deserved 
reputation among the general public as the guardians of society, in comparison to politicians 
who were seen as prone to scandal and self-interest. This also was to change during the l 990's as 
a series of scandals hit the various ministries. At the same time, civil society, which had been 
quite weak previously, was to develop strongly in the l 990's, receiving a large boost from the 
publicity surrounding the numbers of volunteers that flocked to Kobe to assist in the aftermath 
of the earthquake in that city in 1995. 
There have also been significant developments within the aid programme itself. 
Financially, the amount of aid that Japan provides has been steadily decreasing for the last few 
years and this change has effects on all areas of the programme. Both policy-making and 
implementation has had to learn to cope with the new financial realities. Politically, the official 
philosophy behind the Japanese aid programme has been expanded and updated to meet the 
challenges of the early 2I5t century. Administratively, the number of agencies has been reduced 
and the involvement of citizen's groups in aid actively encouraged. 
In a nutshell, the purpose of this paper is, through the prism of these wider societal and 
political changes, to look at both the changes that have been made in the Japanese ODA 
programme in recent years and to further attempt to answer the question of what we can 
reasonably expect from the Japanese aid programme in the near future. 
I will attempt to answer this central question by investigating the literature for analyses 
of both changes and continuities that have occurred in the Japanese ODA programme. While the 
essay is not built on any specific theoretical underpinnings, the central assumption is that aid is a 
contested arena within the Japanese state. Competing actors, particularly the relevant sections of 
the bureaucracy where responsibility for aid has been centred and some wider players, such as 
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politicians, business and the public, attempt to influence the direction aid takes. In particular, 
this paper will place close attention to changes occurring in the political world and in civil 
society in an attempt to evaluate their significance. 
In doing so, this paper will attempt to shed some light on these recent changes by 
putting them in the context of the history of the aid programme and the relations between 
politicians, bureaucracy and people in Japan. I will be especially interested in criticisms made of 
the aid programme and the responses made by the Japanese state to these. The degree of change 
made, or not made, will give us some indication of the degree to which we can expect additional 
developments in the near future. Similarly, given the changes in the political world and the drop 
in esteem awarded to the bureaucracy, the role of politicians in ODA policy-making would 
appear to be changing. 
We will also look critically at the growmg involvement of non-governmental 
organizations, what Hirata calls "rebels" (Hirata, 2003) in aid provision. This change may reflect 
a growing strengthening of civil society in a realm where traditionally bureaucracy has held sway. 
To what extent this is the case and how likely this is to significantly affect ODA is another 
important issue. 
The importance of Japanese aid 
Until 1995, Japanese aid amounts, like the economy, knew only one way - up. Between 1989, 
when Japan surpassed the United States in sheer financial value of aid given, until the peak year 
of 1995, Japanese aid formed a large proportion of overall global aid from the developed 
countries. From the late l 980's, in particular, as the strength of the Japanese economy increased, 
Western, and especially US, researchers produced a number of published theses on its 
importance (for example, Rix, 1993; Orr, 1990; Arase, 1995; Ensign, 1992). 
The Japanese government's finances are not in excellent health. Years of attempting to 
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restart the economy by pumping finance into the construction companies and building large 
infrastructure projects throughout Japan has left the government with large debt levels. This 
combined with the low fertility rate , bringing about a rapid aging of the population, a 
corresponding reduction in the number of working age and the savings rate, leads to a general 
consensus that the government will need to raise taxes significantly, as much as fifty percent, in 
order to remain solvent (Dekle, 2002). 
All budgetary areas are now open to cuts and ODA is no exception. In 1997, then 
Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, and his administration announced a 10% cut in the ODA 
expenditure for the following financial year. This would have been the first ODA budget cut 
made since such aid began (Hirata, 1998). This was however, right on the eve of the Asian 
financial crisis and, in order to protect the economies around Asia, and, consequently, their own, 
the Japanese government, rather than cutting ODA, was effectively forced to raise it again. This 
ODA increase was, however, only a short term measure and, since the budget for the year 2000, 
the amounts allocated for ODA have been cut each year. 
Within these financial constraints, the value of Japanese aid has decreased to 
approximately two thirds of its peak value. This, perhaps combined with the sustained high 
growth of China, has meant that Western research interest in the programme is not as high as it 
once was. The cuts in ODA budget, however, have not necessarily been anticipated by all those 
watching the programme. Despite the seemingly fragile nature of the Japanese economy, as late 
as the year 2000, one analyst felt confident that Japan would continue to maintain its high level 
of ODA, using this as a foreign policy tool (Katada, 2000). As can be seen from Table 2 below, 
the year 2000 was to become, however, the very time that cuts in the total amount allocated to 
Japanese ODA would begin to be implemented. These reductions in spending have continued 
through to the current day. 
Table 2: Japanese ODA amounts over time 
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1986-87 1991-92 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
USO (million) 6,488 11 ,052 10,640 12,163 13,508 9,847 9,283 
Source: OECD (Development Assistance Committee, 2004, p. 5 & 75) 
So, why look at the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme 
now? While the situation for Japanese official aid has undoubtedly changed since the glory days 
of yearly budget increases, the total amount of ODA provided is still extremely significant, 
second only to the United States. Any discussion of world aid and development must still take 
account of aid provided by Japan. While the actual amounts provided are decreasing, this 
significance will -.::ontinue for the foreseeable future . 
Japanese aid is provided globally albeit with a concentration on Asia, providing 
approximately 60% of the total ODA provided to East Asian countries and 50% of that provided 
to South Asian countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a) . This emphasis on Asia can be 
seen in the DAC statistics provided in Table 1 at the beginning of this paper showing that the ten 
largest recipients of Japanese aid in the 2002/3 year were, in order, China, Indonesia, 
Philippines, India, Thailand, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
(Development Assistance Committee, 2005). Japanese ODA is also, however, the largest single 
bilateral ODA provider to 40 countries around the world in 2002, not greatly reduced from its 
peak of 53 with aid provided to less prosperous nations such as those in Africa (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004). 
Why does Japan give aid? 
Each country has its own reasons for providing aid and it would be nai:ve to believe that all or 
even most aid is a result of pure humanitarianism. US aid is clearly tied to its strategic interests 
(Schraeder et al, 1998), German aid is tied in to its own economic interests (Miyashita, 2003) 
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and French to its own former colonies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Western European states have, 
nevertheless, tended to call attention to human rights in their attempts to justify their foreign aid 
to their electorates and to try to avoid being seen as doing anything other than try to assist these 
countries to develop. 
In recent years, thanks to the pressure exerted by activists, for example the Jubilee 
Foundation in the UK, and the Millenium goals set by participating countries at the UN, the 
focus of international development has switched to poverty eradication. The G7, for example, 
has greatly expanded its programme, attempting to deal with the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) to greatly reduce debt in sub-Saharan Africa and even, at the recent 
Gleneagles Summit, provided for full debt relief for these countries. How effective such debt 
relief is and what real results it has had for the people of those countries is extremely debatable 
(see Pilger, 2005, for an extremely critical analysis of the results) . It can be argued, however, that 
there is some genuine interest in providing humanitarian aid in an attempt to make a difference 
in the lives of local people (Spyke, 1999). 
The Japanese state has its own complex reasons for aid. While some analysts go so far 
as to claim Japan has no such genuine interest in helping others and that aid is provided by Japan 
purely for Japanese interests (Spyke, 1999), this does not show the entire picture. As the growing 
numbers of international aid organizations in Japan demonstrate, there are individuals in Japan 
who voluntarily give up their time to help others around the world. Undoubtedly, however, 
foreign aid is an important instrument for the Japanese state in its international diplomacy. The 
Japanese Constitution in a literal reading would seem to outlaw the possession of military forces 
and, in practice, has limited the use of the military forces that do exist to Japan and its 
immediate maritime area. The use of aid, coupled with business investment, therefore, has been 
the major weapon in the Japanese arsenal when attempting to influence the decisions and 
behaviour of developing countries (Kusano, 2000). 
From this state perspective, the underlying motivations for aid over the years would 
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seem to have been to (I) gain acceptance of the world's great powers, (2) remain independent 
and unique in a hostile international environment, (3) remain economically wealthy. Aid 
therefore, becomes, in some ways, a way to impress both the West and the developed nations. It 
has not been an attempt to make the world a better place, per se, but more of an attempt to 
ensure that Japan is one of the leading nations and, therefore, one with greater independence 
over its own decisions than otherwise (Spyke, 1999). This argument continues an analysis of 
Japan's foreign aid from an earlier generation which showed that the aims of post-war Japan 
were essentially the same as those of the pre-war version - to have security, to develop and to be 
ascendant over other nations in the region, at least (Hasegawa, 1975). 
While Japan may not follow an aid policy purely based on moral or humanitarian 
considerations, this is not to say that humanitarian considerations are entirely absent. Japan 
does provide a degree of food aid to assist countries in extreme circumstances, for example and 
grant aid, especially to African nations. The current official Japanese position is , nevertheless, 
that Japanese aid is for Japanese security, trade and well-being. The argument is made here that 
Japan is dependent on the international economy for its resource inputs and its final markets 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). For Japan to provide financial resources to attempt to ensure 
the on-going security of these vital channels and markets is proclaimed as a logical policy 
(Kusano, 2000). 
From a lower level, we should not entirely discount the factor of wider opinion and 
pressure. Japan (that is the Japanese bureaucratic and political elite) often thinks that Japan must 
act to avoid public criticism, an attitude that Hasegawa terms "otsukiai", meaning doing what 
others expect (Hasegawa, 1975, p. 13). This shows its face at times when Japan may be subject to 
criticism from other Asian countries or from its peer donors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
thanks to its participation in international meetings and conferences, would be more likely to be 
aware of, and pay attention to, such international criticism than would, for example, the 
Ministry of Justice and its Immigration Department attempting to keep unwanted foreigners out 
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of Japan. 
There are, indeed, less direct benefits that Japan receives from ODA. Development can 
lead to wider markets, increased consumer spending power and the associated additional 
chances for profit as well as the use of the lower labour charges in those countries for industrial 
production, which can contribute to reducing pollution in Japan (Fukai, 1982). Civil society, in 
contrast to the state, participates in development focused on the outcomes for the recipient 
country and people. This focus on projects outcomes can be at odds with the diplomatic goals 
that provide the background to the state's involvement. As such, civil society is potentially hostile 
to state purposes. The emergence of civil society and its contribution to development is, therefore, 
an interesting development that we will look at in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The power relationship in aid 
From a realist view of aid, the direct provision of aid by one country to another reflects a power 
imbalance or, at minimum, the potential to create a power imbalance. One party can fall into the 
position of relying on the other's provision of funds and may find itself in dangerous waters, if 
the dominant party decides to no longer provide those funds, or only with stricter conditions. 
Clearly, entities providing loans expect to have the loans repaid. Loans provided for 
development purposes are no different and, no matter how much interest is paid, commercial 
entities separate the repayment of interest from repayment of the principal. This means that, for 
example, when the Paris Club, the leading creditor nations, met to discuss loan repayments and 
possible rescheduling of loans for the countries affected by the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami, 
it was a meeting of only the creditor nations. The actual countries most directly affected, the 
ones who must repay loan principals and pay loan interest were not present. One party ( or set of 
parties) has the power to decide what will be done and the other must wait for a decision to be 
made. 
9 
The explicit use of this power to achieve diplomatic goals is something that Japan does 
not normally choose to wield. As I shall show later, when I examine the use of Japanese aid to 
regimes in Indonesia and Myanmar that have not always been as aware of human rights as Japan 
would have liked, the Japanese decision makers have tended to err on the side of keeping good 
relations and protecting commercial interests over strong philosophical statements of human 
rights and democracy. At the same time, however, Japan has used aid to bolster support for its 
whaling campaign, so we should therefore, be extremely sensitive to the role of power especially 
in such bilateral situations. 
My focus in this paper is, in this respect, one-sided in that it focuses only on one part of 
the power dynamic - that of the donor, the more powerful partner in the aid relationship. It is 
within this relationship that any assessment of Japanese aid icons such as Self-Help and focus on 
loans and their repayment must be made. While I will not spend any large amount of time 
investigating the effects of Japanese aid on recipient debt levels, we should not discount the 
leverage this gives Japan over many of the less economically developed nations of the world. 
Methods 
This research was conducted during the period January to October, 2005. It was document based, 
involving library research for printed materials and the Internet for on-line documents. I was 
fortunate enough to have access to a number of large collections of books written in English on 
Japan and this is reflected in the number of such books in the bibliography. A number of these 
books were written by Japanese academics but the number of sources originally written in 
Japanese is far fewer. There is, therefore, the potential that different accounts of Japanese aid 
may have been uncovered had I consulted more sources written in Japanese (which were not 
available in English). 
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Rather than attempting to monitor all media reports over this period, the research 
concentrated on two major national dailies, the Asahi Shimbun, with a centre to slightly left 
orientation, and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the premier business paper. Both sources are highly 
regarded in Japan as 'serious' sources of news and provide good coverage of ODA news. A 
journal devoted to Japanese development issues and initiatives, the International Development 
Journal, also provided monthly news and analysis of the field . 
For the official view of ODA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided significant 
amounts of information. Its annual ODA white paper and statistical breakdown of Japanese aid 
by country every year were extremely useful in providing one official view of ODA and a sense 
of scale of amounts disbursed. The Ministry's Internet site also provided a wide range of 
background and archived information. 
The structure of this paper 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Japanese ODA programme and within this to assess 
what can be reasonably expected of it and what cannot. In order to do this, Chapter 2 will put 
the programme into a historical and social context. With this foundational understanding of 
where the programme originated and its basic structural components, Chapter 3, will proceed to 
look at the criticisms made of the programme in more recent times and the responses made. 
Chapter 4 continues to look at on-going changes in the programme by looking at the role 
politicians and political purposes play in ODA. Chapter 5 looks particularly at the growth of 
influence of NGOs on ODA and attempts to analyse how great this influence will become in the 
near future. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will summarize the information gathered and conclude. 
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